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I. Regional Disparities and Local Public Finances 
1. The trend of regional disparities 
Recently, the public's concerns over economic inequality and no¥iv 
regional disparity are stronger than ever. The possible indicators to 
measure economic disparities could be income, consumption, assets, 
employment and wages. To measure the regional economic gaps 
there are various kinds of indexes available depending upon the point 
of view of the problem. For example, Hatta & Tabuchi (1994) has 
pointed out six main causes of the unipolar concentration in Tokyo 
which were as follows: 1) economies of scale; 2) economies of scope; 
3) economies of localization; 4) economies of urbanization; Ei) 
centralized government system; and 6) international and regional 
division of labor. These six main causes have also been the primary 
factors of regional disparities 1. Thus, not only the economic but also 
political and other factors have led to the regional inequalities. 
However, this paper is not intended to focus on this issue, but rather 
to confirm the facts of recent regional disparities by using several 
indices. 
First of al, according to the OECD, Japan ranked 24th among the 
26 member countries surveyed in terms of the size of regional 
disparities. This result shows that the disparities in Japan are 
consid.ered as the smallest among al the other countries (See Table 
1). 
Figure 1 shows the transition of the Gini coefficient of prefectural 
income per capita from 1955 to 2003. This figure demonstrates that 
regional gaps increased from 1955 to 1961, and then declined during 
* This research was supported by the grant from Kansai University. 
1 Hatta, Tatsuo and Takatoshi Tabuchi (1994), Causes of Unipolar centralization to Tokyo and its 
Countermeasure, in Hatta, T. (ed.), Economic Analyses of Unipolar Centralization to Tokyo, Nihon Kei2:ai 
Shinbun Co. 
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Table 1 Regional disparities (2003) 
Gini Gini 
Rank coefficient of Rank coefficient of per capita per capita 
GDP GDP 
Turkey 1 0.27 Italy 14 0.13 
Mexico 2 0.26 Germany 15 0.12 
Slovak Republic 3 0.22 Spain 15 0.12 
Belgium 4 0.19 Czech Republic 15 0.12 
Hungary 4 0.19 Denmark 15 0.12 
Poland 6 0.18 Norway 19 0.11 
Korea 6 0.18 France 19 0.11 
Ireland 8 0.17 Finland 21 0.10 
United Kingdom ， 0.16 Netherland 21 0.10 
Canada 10 0.15 Australia 21 0.10 
Austria 10 0.15 Greece 24 0.09 
Portugal 12 0.14 Japan 24 0.09 
United States 12 0.14 Sweden 26 0.05 
OECD Average 0.15 
(Source) OECD, Region at a Glance: 2007 Edition, p.59. 
Figure 1 Transition of Gini coefficient of per capita prefectural income 
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(Source) Kaji, Yoshito (2006), The Transition of Regional Disparities and its Background, 
Reference, Vol. No.4. 
the period of rapid growth of the economy until 1975, having slightly 
increased around 1970. After a gradual rise up to 1990 it then began 
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to decrease, and it has started to rise again since 20012. This resullt 
indicates that the transition of regional disparities correspond to th≪3 
major stages of economic developments after World War 13. 
There are many indices, except per capita income, mentioned 
above that can be used when verifying regional disparities. Table 2 
describes a transition of population by regions. The number of peoplt3 
moving into the three major metropolitan areas of Japan continued to 
increase dramatically after World War 1. However, since the late 
1970s people have begun to move out of the Osaka metropolitan 
area, and even the Nagoya area population slightly decreased durin!~ 
that time. In the 1980s, the Tokyo metropolitan area was the only 
place where people continued to move in and showed a consistent 
increase in population. When looking closely at the Tokyo Metropolis 
Table 2 Trend of population by regions 
'1975 I 1980 I 1985 190 195 200 
（％） 
2005 
Hokaido 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.4 ----------------------------- ------------------------ ------------------------ ------------------------
Tohoku 10.5 10.3 10.1 10.0 9.9 9.8 9.5 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------
Kanto-Koshin 31.7 32.2 32.8 3.5 3.8 34.2 34.7 ---------------- --------------------------------------------------------
Hokuriku 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tokai 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kansai 16.7 16.5 16.5 16.4 16.3 16.3 16.3 ・-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chugoku 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.0 ----------------------------- --------------------------------------------------・------・ 
Shikoku 3. 7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 --------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------
Kyushu 1.1 1.1 1.0 10.8 10.7 10.7 10.6 
>If~ii;ニ~;::!:11 li:l;!1 !Il :;III~!iii~!:! ・----------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------
Rural Area 
Total 
5.5 I 5.3 I 54.8 I 54.2 
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
(Note) On March 31, each Fiscal Year. 
54.1 I 53.6 I 52.9 
10.0 10.0 10.0 
(Source) Association of Land & Geography, Handbook of Population by Basic Inhabitant 
Ledger. 
2 Kaji, Yoshito (2006), The Transition of Regional Disparities and its Background, Reference, Vol. No.4. 
3 Tanizawa, Hiroki (1998), The Trend of Regional Disparities and Regional Development Policy, in 
Hokkaido-Tohoku Finance Corporation (ed.),Quarterly Report Tohoku, No.50. 
??
Table 3 Trend of unemployment rate and effective ratio of job openings to job 
applicants (%, people) 
2005 
The : 
: Workforce unemployed : 
Total 1.4 2.3 2.5 3.4 3.0 4.3 0.63 4.7 0.59 6.0 0.95 3,893,712 !65,39,685 --------------------------------- ------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------ --------------•--------------------Hokaido 1.5 2.1 2.6 4.4 3.6 4.4 0.54 4.8 0.46 6.5 0.57 181,523 ! 2,785,794 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------•---------------------Tohoku 1. 1.8 2.1 3.0 2.6 3.5 0.81 4.3 0.59 6.1 0.73 383,908 ! 6,263,474 --------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------•---------------------Kanto-Koshin 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.0 2. 7 4.3 0.57 4.6 0.62 5.6 1.1 1,280,841 ! 23,058,037 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Hokuriku 0.8 1.6 1.7 2.2 2.1 2.9 0.9 3.4 0.80 4.5 1.14 74,851 j 1,673,185 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------Tokai 0.9 1.7 1.8 2.5 2_4 3.5 0.78 3.9 0.7 4.6 1.41 373,352 ! 8,065,503 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------•---------------------Kansai 1.5 2.7 2.9 3.9 3.6 5.3 0.49 5.8 0.48 7.2 0.92 742,186 ! 10,291,87 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------•---------------------Chugoku 1.2 1.9 2.2 3.0 2.6 3.5 0.8 4.1 0.72 5.0 1.10 197,893! 3,918,791 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------•---------------------Shikoku 1.9 2.9 3.1 4.3 3.8 4.5 0.82 5.0 0.6 6.8 0.84 139,236 ! 2,054,146 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---—• ----------------•---------------------Kyushu 2.3 3.2 3.3 4.6 3.7 4.6 0.57 5.1 0.48 6.7 0.70 44,50 ! 6,653,019 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------•---------------------
Okinawa 4.0 8.1 7.7 7.6 7.7 10.3 0.18 9.4 0.28 1.9 0.43 75,372! 635,849 
3 Major Metro.Areas 1.3 2.4 2.5 3.4 3.1 4. 7 0.50 5.0 0.5 6.0 1.1 1,845,412 ! 30,919,896 
Tokyo Area 1.3 2.3 2.4 3.2 2.9 4.6 0.48 4.8 0.5 5.6 1.1 90,273 ! 17,678,11 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------•---------------------Nagoya Area 0.9 1.7 1.9 2.5 2.5 3.6 0.68 4.0 0.72 4.6 1.60 24,10 ! 4,854,560 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------•---------------------
OsakaArea 1.5 2.8 3.1 4.1 3.7 5.6 0.47 6.1 0.47 7.5 0.94 631,029! 8,387,25 
Rural Area 1.4 2.2 2.4 3.4 3.0 3.9 0.74 4.5 0.62 5.9 0.84 2,048,30 ! 34,479,789 
(Note) On October 1, each year. A & B mean unemployment rate and effective ratio of job openings to job 
applicants, respectively. 
(Source) Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Census Report; Ministry of Health, Labour, Welfare, 
Annual Report of Labour Statistics. 
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can be spotted from the transition of the unemployment rate and th•3 
effective ratio of job openings to job applicants. In the past the 
unemployment rate has remained at an extremely low level. However, 
it deteriorated rapidly in the Heisei depression during the 1990s and 
reached 6%, which meant there were 3.9 million unemployed in 200!:i. 
In the 1990s, the unemployment rates in the three major metropolitan 
areas exceeded those in rural areas because that in the Osaka area 
rose to well above the national average. In the Tokyo area and 
especially in the Nagoya area it significantly fel below the national 
average. On the other hand, in rural areas such as Okinawa the 
unemployment rate was the highest of al, and those in Hokkaido, 
Shikoku and Kyushu also deteriorated rapidly in 2005. 
In terms of the effective ratio of job openings to job applicants it 
was rather higher in rural areas than in the three major metropolitan 
areas in the 1990s. However, the situation has changed since 2001. 
While it has dramatically improved in the three metropolitan areas, th,e 
ratio in rural areas has fallen below the national average. The Nagoya 
area has been in the best condition among the three metropolitan 
areas, while the Osaka area has been below the national average. It 
is the worst in Okinawa among the rural areas, with Hokkaido, Tohoku, 
Kyushu and recently Shikoku having also fallen far below the national 
average. Therefore, these facts show that the regional economies are 
experiencing uneven development, both between similar metropolitan 
areas and between metropolitan and rural areas. 
In short, the regional disparities, which were once showing a 
tendency to narrow, have recently started to expand its gap. What 
factors are behind these changes? It can be distinguished by two 
explanations from the preceding study. 
One explains the regional disparities by the prefectural income and 
the local industrial structure. For example, Tanizawa (1998) pointed 
out how they have developed in each period of time. First, they 
narrowed due to the increase in compensation of employees by 
attracting industries during a rapid growth period. Second, they were 
expanded by the development of the service economy in the urban 
areas in the 1980s. Third, in the 1990s when corporate incomes in the 
urban areas fel drastically from the sharp decline in their asset value, 
they have been narrowed by the economic damage that urban areas 
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incurred4. In this explanation, it lays the emphasis on the factors 
which had an impact on regional disparities in each time, respectively, 
as follows: effects of employment and income expansion on the 
regional economy that invited manufacturing companies brought 
about during the time of rapid growth; industrial predominance in the 
urban over rural areas generated by the service economy in the 
1980s; and deterioration of corporate income by the collapse of the 
bubble economy in the 1990s. 
The other explanation is that the provision of the social overhead 
capital by the community development policy operated effectively on 
the development of the regional economy through productivity effects 
(stock effects) and the effects on demand creation (flow effects), 
helping to narrow the regional disparity互 However, recently the 
economic effect of the social overhead capital gradually deteriorated 
in a change of the industrial structure and the regional economy, and 
is believed not to lead to the improvement of total factor productivity6. 
In this sense, it is commonly recognized today that the public 
investment policy in our country should be reexamined. 
Tanizawa pointed out several problems about the community 
development policy in Japan. First, even though the policy of attracting 
factories succeeded to create employment opportunity and increased 
incomes to some extent, it was inadequate for the local technical 
development and acceleration. Second, even local governments 
which did not have enough financial resources gave the provision of 
equipment and facilities high priority over promoting the intangibles. 
Third, "the actual policy effects were poor and the purposes of the 
policy were not clarified". He also criticized that the policy did not 
succeed in making borrowed technology take root in areas by inviting 
factories. In effect he regarded the regional development policy or 
public investment policy as exogenous and questionable. In this 
sense, to be endogenous and sustainable is essential for regional 
autonomous development. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Takagi, Kikuo (2005), Fiscal Analysis of Regional Disparities. 
6 Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance (2002), The role of Government in Stimulating Economic 
Activities in Prefectures. 
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2. National minimum and local public finance 
The reason why this article takes up the problem of a national 
minimum is that this concept is inseparably related with the financial 
equalization system to adjust the inequality among regions. Thia 
difference of economic strength among regions inevitably brings 
financial strength differential between them. However, this means that 
the central government should secure sources of revenue and/or 
financial adjustment for local governments in a weak financial position 
in order to guarantee minimum public services. In this sense, thie 
financial equalization system is indispensable to local government 
finance, and the local allocation tax has been the system whiclh 
provides this role in Japan. 
Originally, the concept of the national minimum was conceived by 
the Webs from Great Britain in 1897 for legal minimum standards for 
such things as working conditions or wage levels. After that, this 
concept was spread widely and was accepted when itwas used as a 
concept to indicate the standard of subsistence cost in the Beveridg1e 
Report in 19477. In Japan this concept was introduced initially by 
GHQ (the General Headquarters of occupying nations) in 1946 as a 
guiding principle for social welfare reform. It contained three principles; 
namely, national responsibility, indiscrimination and equality, fulfillment 
of necessities. Thereafter, it is assumed that it has been diverted and 
applied to other public services from the minimum cost of living互
On the other hand, an idea has been growing recently that 
demands the central government should cut its grants to local 
governments since the national minimum has already been achieved. 
The typical examples of such a view are the "Proposition on the FY 
2002 Budget Formation" (November, 2002) by the Fiscal Systern 
Council and the opinions of expert members at the Council on 
Economic and Fiscal Policy. For example, the proposition of the Fiscal 
System Council stated that the national minimum was already 
achieved in many fields, and insisted that one of the two roles of the 
local allocation tax to guarantee revenue for local governments, which 
7 Nishio, Masaru (2005), Decentralization reform needs complete reconsideration of'national minimum,' 
Urban Problem, Vol.96, No.5. 
8 Ibid. 
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they thought led to a moral hazard for local financial administrations, 
should be abolished and only the second role to adjust imbalances in 
the revenue sources of local governments be maintained. They 
claimed that it is necessary to clarify the relationship between the 
benefits and the burden in regional finance. Furthermore, the report 
titled "The point at issue on the relationship between central and local 
governments" (18 May 2001) submitted by expert members, Jiro 
Ushio and Masaaki Honma, to the Council on Economic and Fiscal 
Policy also had a similar view and emphasized that by reviewing the 
roles of central and local government administration, fiscal transfer 
from the central government to local governments, or the local 
allocation tax grant and national government disbursements (specific 
grants), should have been reduced to the minimum necessary. In that 
case, differences in the level of public services among the regions 
might occur. From now on, Ushio and Honma continued, the former 
unified national minimum should not be secured, but the differences 
among regions be approved. 
The prescription here is the idea of "competitive decentralization" 
based on neo-liberalism. It leads to the notion of local allocation tax 
grant reduction or abolition. Advocates of competitive decentralization 
have some opinions in common. First, a process of administration 
such as the calculation of the basic fiscal needs or the decision of the 
total sum of the tax grant is opaque. Second, dependence on the tax 
grant of the local governments promotes a moral hazard and 
inefficiency in the financial administration. Third, in order to rectify the 
problem, it is necessary to raise the transparency of the administration 
by simplifying the calculation of the basic fiscal needs and to restrict 
the discretion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
Fourth, at the same time, redistribution of financial resources among 
regions is to be limited (and abolished in the end) by reducing the 
scale of the tax grant9. 
However, this'reform'scheme would not be able to solve the 
current community affairs or the regional disparities that Japan faces. 
The fundamental plan of the reform must be "decentralization on 
resident autonomy", not "competitive decentralization". Such a plan is 
9 Akai, N., T. Sato & K. Yamashita (2003), Economics of Local Allocation Tax 
9!5 
specified in the thinking and concept of'The European Charter of 
Local Self-Government'. The Charter was adopted by the CommitteH 
of Ministers, Council of Europe in 1985. It is the multilateral convention 
which went into effect in 1988, and it is the first one in the world to 
declare the principles of local autonomy in the form of an international 
agreement. 
The principles are enshrined in the preamble of the Charter. First, 
the local authorities are one of the main foundations of any democratic 
regime. Second, the right of citizens to participate in the conduct of 
public affairs is one of the democratic principles that are shared by all 
member States of the Council of Europe. Third, it is at the local level 
that this right can be most directly exercised. Fourth, the existence of 
local authorities with real responsibilities can provide an administration 
which is both effective and close to the citizens. Fifth, the safeguardin!J 
and reinforcement of local self-government in the different European 
countries is an important contribution to the construction of a Europe 
based on the principles of democracy and the decentralization of 
power. Sixth, this entails the existence of local authorities endowed 
with democratically constituted decision-making bodies and possessin!J 
a wide degree of autonomy with regard to their responsibilities, the 
ways and means by which those responsibilities are exercised and 
the resources required for their fulfillment 1°. It goes without saying that 
these principles can be basically applied to areas outside of Europe. 
In accordance with the sprit of the Charter, it clarifies the concept 
of the local autonomy in Article 3 in that local self-government denotes 
the right and the ability of local authorities to regulate and manage a 
substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in 
the interests of the local population. In Article 4, it is stipulated thc1t 
local authorities shall have ful discretion to exercise their initiativ,3 
with regard to any matter, that public responsibilities shall generally 
be exercised, in preference, by those authorities who are closest to 
the citizen, and that powers given to local authorities shall normally be 
ful and exclusive. Furthermore, in Article 9 the principles of fiscal 
autonomy are provided as follows: 1)entitlement of local authorities to 
adequate financial resources of their own; 2)empowerment to local 
10 Council of Europe (1985), European Charter of Local Self-Government. 
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authorities to determine the rates of local taxes and charges; 3) 
security of diversity and buoyancy of financial resources; 4)protection 
of financially weaker local authorities by the institution of financial 
equalization schemes or equivalent measures; 5)vesting local 
authorities with the right of proposal for the allocation of financial 
resources; 6)denial of earmarked grants and the basic freedom of 
local authorities to exercise policy discretion. Therefore, the Charter 
has declared that local autonomy based on democracy consists of the 
comprehensive empowerment of local authorities, the principle of 
subsidiarity, organizational autonomy, and fiscal autonomy and the 
likeり
Taking the Charter as a guiding star, Jinno and lkegami (2003) 
have set five criteria for formulating a plan for local allocation tax 
reform12. First, specified grants should be reduced as much as 
possible. Second, assuming the limitation of subsidized projects, 
financial resources should be redistributed between central and local 
governments in accordance with the distribution of responsibilities 
between them. Third, financial resources should be guaranteed to 
correct fiscal disparities among regions and accomplish the minimum 
of public services allocated to the local governments. Fourth, the 
method used to correct fiscal disparities among regions and to 
guarantee minimum public services must not restrict the decision-
making of the local governments. Fifth, the decision-making as to 
what extent to correct fiscal disparities and where to set the minimum 
standard should be entrusted to the people, and at the same time the 
people should be empowered to give their opinion to the local 
governments. 
Based on these criteria, Jinno and lkegami suggested a local 
allocation tax reform plan. First, the total amount of the local allocation 
tax should be set from the viewpoint of the vertical financial adjustment, 
and which taxes should be put into the local allocation tax and how 
they should be transferred need to be examined. Second, simplification 
of the calculation of basic fiscal needs does not always improve the 
problem. The content of a national minimum and the method to 
1 Sugihara, Y. et al.(ed.) (203), Research Materials: Modern Local Self-Government, p.83. 
12 Jinno, N. and T. lkegami (203), The Local A/location Tax: What are the Problems? 
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calculate the financial resources necessary for the maintenance and 
achievement of the national minimum always need to be renewed 
depending on changing situations. Third, inclusion of specified fiscal 
needs in the calculation of the local allocation tax to encourage the 
local government toward specific types of projects should b1e 
abolished. Fourth, It is necessary to let local authorities participate in 
the decision-making process of the local allocation tax. 
This suggestion basically deserves recognition. It is against the 
democratic rules and principles of local autonomy to decide one-
sidedly from the top, or to reduce the local allocation tax asserting 
without enough inspection that the national minimum has been 
achieved. The following conditions must be premised when initiating 
the reform: 1) thorough disclosure of information; 2) security of 
transparency; 3) shift from the discretion of the executive branch to a 
rule; 4) arrangement for an equal consultation between local and 
central governments; 5) security for the participation of the 
inhabitants. 
I. The'Trinity Reform'and Local Public Finances 
1. Outline of the'trinity reform' 
The primary purpose of the'trinity reform'is to review the fiscal 
relationship of the central and local governments and to strengthen 
the fiscal autonomy of the local authorities through the transfer of tax 
revenues from national to local taxes, reform of the central government 
specific grants, and of the local allocation tax system. The first stage 
of decentralization reform began with the'Resolution of Promoting 
Decentralization'in the Diet in 1993, and ended with enforcement of 
the Omnibus Decentralization Act in 2000. The'trinity reform'has 
been regarded as the second stage of decentralization. If the result of 
the first stage was the abolition of the system of delegated functions, 
though not quite satisfactorily, the urgent task of the second stage 
was to incarnate fiscal decentralization by promoting the transfer of 
tax revenues from the central to local governments回
The purpose to promote decentralization was to create'a society 
13 Jinno, N. (ed.) (2006), Trinity Reform, Local Public Finances and Local Taxes. 
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in which you can actually feel comfortable and fulfilled'or'a community 
which is ful of vitality and individuality'as was enshrined in the 
'Resolution of Promoting Decentralization'and the Omnibus 
Decentralization Act. The substance of society or the blueprint of the 
community assumed there is not exactly clear. If regeneration of the 
community and the life of local residents was taken into consideration, 
the'trinity reform'should have given the highest priority to strengthen 
the financial bases of local governments and to promote the transfer 
of tax revenues and an increase of general revenue sources in order 
to strengthen the right to self-determination of local governments and 
local residents. However, the'trinity reform'that was actually carried 
out deteriorated into the reconstruction of central government finances 
rather than pushing fiscal decentralization to the local governments. 
Table 4 presents the overall picture of the'trinity reform'. In addition 
to a reduction of specific grants of about¥4. 7 trillion, local allocation 
tax was reduced by¥5.1 trillion. On the other hand, since the sum of 
the transfer of tax revenues was only about¥3 trillion, the net reduction 
of¥6.8 trillion was left for local governments to raise. Failure in the 
security of local revenue sources by the central government has had 
the result of triggering bankruptcy or fiscal difficulties for local 
governments. 
2. The assessments of the'trinity reform' 
For the present'the first-term reform'of the second stage has 
come to an end. The problem now is how the result of'the reform' 
should be evaluated? 
First, not only realizing the transfer of tax revenues of¥3 trillion 
from income tax to the individual inhabitant tax, but also advancing it 
together with the reduction of specific grants as one indication of 
strengthening of fiscal autonomy, deserves appreciation. Second, 
because the transfer of tax revenues works to the advantage of urban 
areas and there is a possibility of conflict between urban and rural 
areas. It was an important proposal in terms of the development of 
cooperation between urban and rural areas for local governments to 
think of reliable fiscal support from the local allocation tax as a 
prerequisite for the reform. Third, an association of six local 
government organizations (hereinafter six locals) was united to the 
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Table 4 Targets and results of'Trinity Reform' (¥Trillion) 
Reform of Specific Grants Transfer of Tax Revenues Reform of Local Allocation Tax 
Reduction of the Sum of Local Allocation Tax O.B 
FY 2002 Start of Reduced R
evision of Cost Differential per Unit and of Working Expenses 
The'Trinity Reform'Decided (Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal 
Policy Management and Structural Reform 2002) 
Temporary Reduction 0.6 0.2 Reduction 1.ti 
FY 2003 Goal of Reduction 
(Basic Policies 2003)4.0 
Reduction 1.0 Transfer 0.5 Reduction 1.; 
(Reduction of 2.9 If 
FY 2004 "have 
local Goal of Amount Provisional Bond for 
governments propose Transterred (Basic Replenishing Revenue 
reform plan" (Basic Policies 2004) Included) 
Policies 2004) 3.0 
Reduction 1.8 Transfer 1.1 The same Amount as 
Last Year's (Reduction of 
FY 2005 1.0 If Provisional Bond for 
Replenishing Revenue 
Included) 
Reduction 1.8 Transfer 1.2 Reduction 1.0 
(Amount Decided in 2004 (0.6 Amount Decided in (Reduction of 1.3 If 
FY 2006 0.6; that in 2005 1.2) 2004 and 2005, Provisional Bond for 
Respectively) Replenishing Revenue 
Included) 
Reduction 4.7 Transfer 3.0 Reduction 5:1 
Total (Do Not Include the 
(Include the Amount (2004-06. Provisional 
Amount Carried-out in Carried-out in 2003) Bond for Replenishing 
2003) Revenue Included) 
(Source) Zensho Okamoto Web site. 
end and continued demanding better treatment from central authority. 
It was an important process in history to obtain a certain amount of 
results 14. It indicated the predominance of the policy for the local side 
to have worked out "a reform plan about specific grants" twice over. It 
deserved appreciation for the six locals to appeal to public opinion as 
a group against the central government which had been negative in 
14 Kanazawa, Furnia (2006), From the Trinity Reform to the Third Stage of Decentralization, Local Pub1'ic 
Finance(Chiho-zaisei) 
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the'decentralization reform'. Fourth, it was an epoch-making result to 
establish a common ground for equal consultation between local and 
central governments. 
Nevertheless'the first-term reform (trinity reform)'failed to realize 
the desired result, judging from the aims that local governments 
originally claimed in decentralization reform. 
First, the scale of tax revenues transferred did not reach 40% in 
terms of the scale which the six locals had originally expected (¥8 
trillion). Second, according to the data which the six locals presented, 
the reduction of specific grants realized in this'reform'was only 38% 
or so out of¥3.2 trillion of specific grant reductions that the six locals 
suggested, and only 12% without those associated with compulsory 
education (see Table 5). It did not contribute to the expansion of self-
reliance or independency of local authorities. Third, not only the 
amount of money was reduced, but also the substance, where the 
reduction of specific grants was carried out in many cases by a cut in 
the grant rate. In this sense, the central government can stil dominate 
local government expenditures by means of a statutory control and 
centrally determined grants-in-aid. Therefore, it is against the idea of 
"the true decentralization reform". Fourth, measures really taken in 
Table 5 Extent of realization of six locals plan (¥Million) 
Decision in FY 2004 Decision in FY 2005 
Local 
by ReMsipnoisntsrie sResult Local by ReMsipnoisntrsie sResult Total Plan Plan 
Grants (Current) 5,742 229 980 2,185 421 421 
National CTrueraresnutry ) Obligatory 
Shares ( 6,437 581 1,232 2,584 591 591 
Provision of equipments 5,712 ゜゜5,203 ゜670 and facilities Public Works 5,889 ゜゜゜゜゜Compulsory Education 8,504 ゜8,500 ゜゜゜Subtotal 32,284 810 10,711 9,973 1,012 1,682 12,393 33.2% 5.2% 38.4% 
National Health Insurance 一 ＿ 6,851 
Carried-out in FY 2004 7,093 
Children's Allowance and the Like 166 4,862 
Total 32,284 810 24,655 9,973 1,178 6,544 31,199 
(Source) Zensho Okamoto Web site. 
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the process of decentralization were inconsistent, in many respects, 
with the aims of "the true decentralization reform". Giving som≪3 
examples, the abolition of specific grants without a transfer of tax 
revenues or a cut of grants by using a "budget ceiling" were put into 
force on the pretense of "streamlining". Or there were attempts to 
authorize the central government and to withhold revenue sources by 
establishing subsidies that have the "same or similar purpose/ content" 
while abolishing specific grants固 Fifth,the reduction of the welfana 
benefits grant rate was withdrawn this time by the objection of the six 
locals. But the government and ruling parties'agreement at the end of 
2005 stated that "local governments will grapple seriously with makin!;J 
the welfare benefits reasonable. With that in mind, if it is not effective, 
the national (government and the ruling parties) and local governments 
shall examine necessary reform immediately and carry it out". This 
could well trigger another dispute between national and local 
governments. Finally, though the'trinity reform'advocated reform of 
specific grants, transfer of tax revenues and the local allocation tax as 
a package, how to reform the local allocation tax is stil not clear. In 
the meantime, the local allocation tax of¥5.1 trillion was reduced 
against the background of thoughts that the role of the local allocation 
tax to guarantee revenue for local governments should be abolished, 
or that security of revenue sources to local governments should be 
limited only to the equivalence of the national minimum. The six locals 
demanded the financial resources from the local allocation tax, but 
how the local allocation tax could be reformed has not been made 
clear yet. As already mentioned, the'first-term reform'came to an 
end, and there are fears that confrontation will intensify among local 
entities concerning how to reform the local allocation tax. It is an 
urgent priority to decide on a policy. 
There are many problems to be solved regarding the'decentralization 
reform'.'The European Charter'declares to improve the inhabitants 
welfare through establishment of the principles already mentioned. If 
the aim of the'trinity reform'had been to establish fiscal autonomy, its 
terminus ad quern is stil a long way from these principles that the 
15 Japan Association of Six Local Government Organizations (2004), Reform Plan on National Treasury 
Obligatory Shares and the Like. 
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'Charter'holds up. The tasks to be solved in decentralization reform 
stil remain. The questions are as follows: To what extent could the six 
locals challenge the national government to arguments about 
decentralization policy?; Can the future'decentralization reform'open 
up its prospects by developing'the second-term reform'as an 
extension of the first-term reform?; Is it possible to carry out the 
reform of the local allocation tax necessary for stable administration of 
local finances?; Is it possible for the reform to get support from the 
public?; Is it possible to establish a common ground for an equal 
consultation between local and central governments in the future? 
Il. Municipal Mergers and Local Autonomy 
In Japan the national government has always carried out large-
scale municipal mergers whenever they planned to change the system 
of local administration. Since the middle of the Meiji era (1868-1912) 
there were two major waves in municipal mergers. The Great Merger 
of Meiji, which occurred from 1888 through 1889, was the first with 
the aim of enabling local governments to deal with newly created 
administrative responsibilities, including tax collection, civil engineering, 
and especially the compulsory education system. Along with this 
reform, towns and villages were established as local municipalities. 
The second was the Great Merger of Showa, which was executed 
from 1953 through 1956 in an attempt to fulfil the newly entrusted 
local governments'tasks of establishing and managing junior high 
schools, administering local fire-fighting organizations, operating local 
government police, and providing for the services of social welfare, 
health and hygiene 16. 
At present, the third wave, the so-called "Great Merger of Heisei", 
is in progress. How the number of municipalities classified by their 
populations has changed is shown in Table 6. In this merger, local 
governments whose population were less than 10,000 decreased 
most in number, and the number that had a population from 10,000 to 
30,000 exclusive declined the second most. In sum, for the most part 
16 Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (2006), Municipal Mergers in Japan, CLAIR Fact 
Sheet, No.9 
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sparsely populated towns and villages were driven to merge in the 
name of making administrative operations more effective, enforcin!;] 
the financial power in order to provide effective public services for 
residents, and so forth. Due to municipal mergers of Heisei era, cities 
have grown from 90.36 million (76.8% of the total population) to 
105.55 million (88.5%) in population and increased their covered area 
from 4,923 km2 (28.3% of the gross national area) to 207,659 krr12 
(55.9%). It may be argued that the city-centered municipal systern 
has been strengthened on the whole because of the growth of the 
population and the area that cities occupy. But this recognition is 
doubtful. Because the population density of cities has fallen 
considerably and immense rural areas that have no urban infrastructures 
have been artificially incorporated into urban jurisdictions. It means 
that rural areas are to be treated as urban areas. But it is impossible 
to provide the same public services for rural areas as for urban 
districts for both administrative and financial reasons. It is feared that 
regional disparities will widen and peripheral areas will be left behind 
by the development and prosperity in artificially expanded urban 
jurisdictions. 
The purposes of the Great Merger of Heisei have been explained 
above, but itseems that the real intention is to reduce local government 
expenditures and to rebuild the local finances by increasing the scale 
of local governments. But the mere reduction of local budget deficits 
Table 6 Change of the number of municipalities by scale of population 
31 March 1999 31 March 2006 
Number ％ Number ％ 
500,000 and over 21 0.6 26 1.4 
From 300,000 to 500,000 Exclusive 43 1.3 46 2.5 
From 200,000 to 300,000 Exclusive 41 1.3 40 2.2 
From 100,000 to 200,000 Exclusive 115 3.6 150 8.2 
From 50,000 to 100,000 Exclusive 227 7.0 276 15.2 
From 30,000 to 50,000 Exclusive 262 8.1 265 14.6 
From 10,000 to 30,000 Exclusive 986 30.5 514 28.2 
less than 10,000 1,537 47.6 504 27.7 
Total 3,232 100.0 1,821 100.0 
(Source) Yokomichi, K. (2007), The Process, Result, and Tasks of the Great Merger of 
Heisei, Regional Policy—From Mie, No.22, p.10. 
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will drive many communities into peril and widen regional disparities. 
Both national and local governments are in financial difficulties. 
Accordingly, it is essential to encourage residents to participate fully in 
local governance and to form partnerships among the public sector, 
cooperatives, trade unions, non-profit organizations and private 
sectors in order to stimulate community development and revitalize 
local self-governments. In addition fiscal autonomy of local governments 
which supports residents'autonomy must be secured. 
Decentralization stil remains an "unfinished reform" in Japan. We 
are once more facing a big task to carve out new horizons on how to 
establish local and fiscal autonomy and to realize endogenous 
development for a sustainable society. 
